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EXPLAINING THE IMPORTANCE OF
PUBLIC CHOICE FOR LAW
D. Daniel Sokol*
Public Choice Concepts and Applications in Law. By Maxwell L.
Stearns & Todd J. Zywicki. St. Paul: West. 2009. Pp. liv, 601. $70.
Introduction
Many top elected and appointed federal officials can recall days of outlining for their 1L torts and contracts classes and being cold called in
criminal law. JD holders include the president and vice president, as well as
1
six of the fifteen cabinet members. More than half of the current members
of the US Senate hold law degrees, as do more than a third of the members
2
of the House of Representatives. Many more lawyers (or former lawyers)
3
head administrative agencies. At the state level, many governors and state
4
legislators also have legal backgrounds. Though members of the judiciary
are not required to hold law degrees, nearly all do at the state and federal
5
levels. These decision makers play an important role in the function of law
within society.
Law is dynamic, as law shapes behavior. Behavior also shapes law. Public choice can help us to understand this dynamic behavior. At its core,
public choice is the use of economics to understand political science. Public
choice thus addresses various opportunities for and constraints on behavior
in public life in a manner akin to how economics does so in private life (the
market). Public choice also assumes rational actors who maximize their
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Florida. I want to thank Fred McChesney, Bill
Page, Max Stearns, and Todd Zywicki for helpful comments.
1. Hillary Rodham Clinton, Eric H. Holder, Jr., Ken Salazar, Tom Vilsack, Gary Locke, and
Janet Napolitano.
2. American Bar Association, Lawyers in the 111th Congress—Senate, http://
new.abanet.org/calendar/ABAday/Documents/LawyersCongressSenate2010.pdf (last visited Aug.
20, 2010); American Bar Association, Lawyers in the 111th Congress—House of Representatives,
http://new.abanet.org/calendar/ABAday/Documents/LawyersCongressHouse2010.pdf (last visited
Aug. 20, 2010).
3. See USA.gov, A-Z Index of Government Departments and Agencies, http://www.usa.gov
(follow “Site Index” hyperlink and then the “A-Z Agency Index” hyperlink) (last visited Aug. 20,
2010).
4. National Conference of State Legislatures, 2009 State Legislator Education Levels,
http://www.ncsl.org/default.aspx?tabid=19823; see National Governors Association, Governors of the American States, Commonwealths and Territories (2010), http://www.nga.org/
Files/pdf/BIOBOOK.pdf.
5. See Federal Judicial Center, Biographical Directory of Federal Judges, http://
www.fjc.gov/history/judges.html; National Center for State Courts, State Court Web sites, http://
www.ncsc.org/Web%20Document%20Library/IR_CourtSites.aspx.
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utility. Since the 1960s, the use of public choice has had a profound impact
in the academic study of law by both those inside and outside of law
6
schools. Given the importance of policy to the law, it is rather odd that the
study of public choice has not been a staple of the law school curriculum.
Students are likely to be introduced to public choice in classes that specialize in legislation. Yet, outside of administrative law and legislation, most
statutory classes (commercial, corporations, environmental, and tax to name
just a few) do not use public choice as a major explanatory tool for policy
choices in a given area of law. In common law classes, public choice may
often be overlooked altogether.
The next generation of government officials, business leaders, and
members of civil society likely will draw from the current pool of law
school students. These students often lack a foundation of the theoretical
and analytical tools necessary to understand law’s interplay with government. This highlights the importance of public choice analysis. By framing
issues through a public choice lens, these students will learn the dynamics
of effective decision making within various institutional settings. Filling the
void of how to explain the decision-making process of institutional actors in
legal settings is Public Choice Concepts and Applications in Law by Max7
8
well Stearns and Todd Zywicki.
Normally, casebooks are not endeavors worthy of a book review.
Mainly, they collect cases and provide introductory and concluding comments that provide context and analysis of cases. In sharp contrast, Stearns
and Zywicki provide a research tool and resource for students and faculty to
understand public choice and law. Public Choice Concepts is a book that
focuses on theory, analysis, and case studies rather than edited versions of
cases as its primary pedagogical device. This alone should excite students
who have read enough cases and yearn for class materials that allow them to
begin to apply analysis of their own.
Because of its analytic depth, Public Choice Concepts is likely to be
recognized as the leading work on the subject for some time. Stearns and
Zywicki’s contribution to public choice scholarship is important and compelling. Part I of this Review addresses common misperceptions about
public choice, provides a descriptive summary of the book, explains its important implications, and suggests some limitations. Part II takes issue with
Stearns and Zywicki on one important ground—their failure to adequately
consider public choice issues in an international context. A number of issues
of international importance, such as trade and environmental, and financial
6. See, e.g., Jerry L. Mashaw, Greed, Chaos, and Governance: Using Public Choice
to Improve Public Law (1997) (expressing ambivalence to public choice); Dennis C. Mueller,
Public Choice III (2003) (providing an overview of the public choice literature to date); Research
Handbook on Public Choice and Public Law (Daniel A. Farber & Anne Joseph O’Connell eds.,
2010) (offering insights into the current state of public choice legal issues).
7.

Professor of Law and Marbury Research Professor, University of Maryland School of

Law.
8. George Mason University Foundation Professor of Law, George Mason University
School of Law.
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regulation, have become daily staples in policy debates. This Part describes
how an understanding of public choice can offer insights into international
antitrust.
I. Public Choice and Law
A. Misguided Perceptions About Public Choice
Public choice is not the sole method of analysis of a given legal problem. However, it can serve to enrich the analytical framework of law and
legal institutions. Some features of law that seem puzzling to traditional
analytical approaches can be explained by public choice analysis. Unfortunately, legal academics oftentimes do not understand public choice and hold
a caricatured view of what it embraces.
Public choice comes in a number of different varieties. Interest group
theory is often treated as shorthand for public choice. However, public
choice theory also incorporates social choice theory, game theory, and other
subfields. Because some of the economic theory-of-regulation public choice
literature originated among Chicago School economists, many mistakenly
presume that public choice is a right wing deregulatory ideological movement. In fact, public choice has been embraced by political scientists,
economists, and law professors of the left and the right. Users of public
9
10
11
choice include Daniel Farber, Phil Frickey, Jerry Mashaw, Cass Sun12
13
14
stein, Stephen Breyer, and William Eskridge. Indeed, Public Choice
Concepts is a collaboration between a left-leaning public-law scholar
15
(Stearns) and a right-leaning public-private-interface scholar (Zywicki).
Another misperception about public choice is that it is overly pessimistic
about politics. Merrill goes so far as to suggest that public choice serves to
“encourage cynicism about governmental institutions, and to promote hostil16
ity toward any invocation of the coercive powers of the state.” This concern
suggests that the spread of public choice may create self-interested behavior
that public choice scholars claim is merely a fact of the world. If selfishness
9.

Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, Law and Public Choice (1991).

10.

Id.

11.

Mashaw, supra note 6.

12. See Cass R. Sunstein et al., Are Judges Political?: An Empirical Analysis of
the Federal Judiciary (2006) (examining the degree to which judges act according to their own
interests).
13. See Stephen Breyer, Breaking the Vicious Circle: Toward Effective Risk
Regulation (1993).
14. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Politics Without Romance: Implications of Public Choice Theory for Statutory Interpretation, 74 Va. L. Rev. 275 (1988).
15. See Posting of Todd Zywicki to The Volokh Conspiracy, The Further Left You Are the
Less You Know About Economics, http://volokh.com/2010/05/06/the-further-left-you-are-the-lessyou-know-about-economicsr/ (May 6, 2010, 8:23 PM).
16. Thomas W. Merrill, Capture Theory and the Courts: 1967–1983, 72 Chi.-Kent L. Rev.
1039, 1070 (1997).
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exists naturally and public choice accurately describes this selfishness, then
cynicism will set in on the part of political actors. The very study of public
choice reduces cooperation and destroys traditional social understandings
17
among its students. Such a critique has its origins in the Marxist argument
18
that capitalism creates selfishness.
A response to this critique is that public choice does not claim that increased selfishness is a good thing. Public choice theorists want
constitutional arrangements that maximize general interest in order to better
combat selfishness. For Stearns and Zywicki, the purpose of the book and of
public choice is to serve a more positive and descriptive function. Understanding public choice allows actors in the legal and political systems to
19
better understand policy tradeoffs and implications. With this knowledge,
such actors can make decisions more likely to maximize social welfare.
In creating new institutional arrangements to maximize social welfare,
public choice has normative implications, rather than merely a descriptive
20
function. Public Choice Concepts identifies these normative implications
throughout the book, although it does so implicitly. The book explores how
an understanding of public choice suggests tools to help institutions overcome some of the flaws that public choice identifies.
B. The Contribution of Public Choice Concepts
and Applications in Law
Understanding the value of Public Choice Concepts requires an understanding of what distinguishes it from other works in the field. Public
Choice Concepts is not akin in its depth and breadth to the comprehensive
21
survey of theoretical and empirical work found in Public Choice III. Nor is
the textbook akin to the excellent Research Handbook on Public Choice and
22
Public Law, which provides a survey of the latest theory and applications
of public choice across a number of different thematic and substantive areas
of law. Instead, the importance of Stearns and Zywicki’s contribution is twofold. First, it is a textbook that serves as a primer for those who are
unfamiliar with the importance of public choice, whether they are scholars
who focus their academic work on legal institutions or students who learn
about these institutions for careers in law, business, or government. As a

17.

Lionel Orchard & Hugh Stretton, Public choice, Cambridge J. Econ., May 1997, at 409,

423.
18. See Karl Marx & Friedrich Engels, Manifesto of the Communist Party (English
Edition 1888), reprinted in Basic Writings on Politics and Philosophy 1, 9 (Lewis S. Feur ed.,
1959).
19. Pp. ix–x. They are not the first to note that public choice is not dismal in nature. See
Mashaw, supra note 6, at 31.
20. Jim Rossi, Public Choice Theory and the Fragmented Web of the Contemporary Administrative State, 96 Mich. L. Rev. 1746, 1774 (1998) (reviewing Mashaw, supra note 6).
21.

Mueller, supra note 6.

22.

Pp. vii–viii; Research Handbook in Public Choice and Public Law, supra note 6.
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result, Public Choice Concepts serves as an effective tool for teaching key
concepts of public choice law to both students and professors. It is far less
technical and more accessible than Public Choice III. Second, Public
Choice Concepts informs those social scientists and law professors who
understand public choice but not necessarily its applications to different areas of law.
The book’s first part is an overview of the core concepts in public
choice. These include collective decision making, interest group theory, rent
seeking, social choice theory, and game theory. The second part focuses on
institutional issues, and in particular collective decision-making areas: legislatures, the executive branch and administrative agencies, and the judiciary.
It also addresses constitutional structure. Online supplements in part three of
the book provide additional depth in other areas of law’s intersection with
policy, such as antitrust, bankruptcy, the Commerce Clause, corporate law,
environmental law, and corruption.
Chapter One discusses how institutions affect decision making. The authors note that behavior by rational actors will vary based on the
institutional structure in which actors find themselves (p. 10). Stearns and
Zywicki simplify what they mean by an institution, using the well-known
23
work of Nobel laureate Douglass North. In fact, institutional analysis is
quite complex and what one means by an institution may vary. Using an
oversimplified definition of institutions might distort one’s understanding of
24
how institutions affect behavior. Pedagogically, the use of simple models
early on allows for the development of greater complexity later. However, an
explicit revisiting of the nature of institutions would strengthen the book.
Once they define an institution, Stearns and Zywicki provide an easyto-follow example to illustrate the importance of institutional design: they
examine the differences in the behavior of appointed and elected judges
(pp. 11–12). Appointed judges face voter anger if they decide a case in an
unpopular way. Thus, these judges will be more likely to conform to voter
preferences. In contrast, appointed judges have less pressure from voters
because of their relative insulation from voter preferences. Yet, appointed
judges are subject to their own public choice concerns. They still care
about the reception of their decisions and face a number of other issues
that shape their judicial behavior, such as desires for income, leisure rela25
tive to private-sector lawyers, and job satisfaction.

23. P. 11 (citing Douglass C. North, Economic Performance Through Time, 84 Am. Econ.
Rev. 359, 360 (1994)).
24. Cf. Avner Greif, Institutions and the Path to the Modern Economy 29–54
(2006) (spending an entire chapter analyzing what is meant by the term “institution”).
25. Frank B. Cross, Political Science and the New Legal Realism: A Case of Unfortunate
Interdisciplinary Ignorance, 92 Nw. U. L. Rev. 251, 302 (1997) (noting that “a judge may receive
satisfaction from ‘having performed his duty’ ”); Richard A. Posner, What Do Judges and Justices
Maximize? (The Same Thing Everybody Else Does), 3 Sup. Ct. Econ. Rev. 1, 1–2 (1993) (noting
that judicial utility function includes income and leisure); Stephen J. Choi et al., Professionals or
Politicians?: The Uncertain Empirical Case for an Elected Rather than Appointed Judiciary, 4
(Univ. Chi. Law Sch. John M Olin Law & Econ. Working Paper No. 357, 2007), available at
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In their chapter on the economic theory of regulation, Stearns and
Zywicki draw heavily upon Chicago theorists (Chapter Two). They begin
with Stigler, whose seminal work suggested that what drives the political
process is private, rather than public, interest. Interest groups seek rents for
26
their benefit at the expense of society at large. They also discuss how
Peltzman and Becker refined the Stigler model (p. 51). The former addressed the issue of group size in the influence of interest groups, in which
well-organized, smaller groups can seek redistribution through the regula27
tory process. The latter explored how competition might lead to the more
efficient transfer of rents because a vote-maximizing government official
28
has to make tradeoffs across a number of interests. These insights into the
nature of regulation have important policy implications.
Public Choice Concepts provides an application of regulation and interest group theory that has particular salience and interest to law school
students: the licensing of attorneys via the bar exam (pp. 52–53). As Stearns
and Zywicki explain, there is a tradeoff for using the bar exam to regulate
the provision of lawyers (p. 52). On the one hand, the bar exam creates a
barrier to entry into competition for the provision of legal services (and
therefore creates upward price pressure for legal services). On the other
hand, the bar exam serves as a check on quality. It weeds out potential lawyers who lack the basic understanding and competency necessary to advise
potential clients.
The form of the bar exam suggests a public choice explanation. The bar
passage rate correlates with the number of applicants who take the bar
exam. If the bar exam merely existed as a floor to measure quality, the passage rate would vary from exam to exam in a given year based on the
number of students who attained a sufficient level of knowledge. Nevertheless, the overall bar passage rates hold constant.
Public choice explains this outcome and its consequences. Existing lawyers who run the accreditation process want to keep the total supply of
lawyers down in order to keep legal fees high. Such rent seeking has consequences for consumers of legal services. Some consumers will be priced out
of legal services and attempt to undertake legal representation on their own
or employ other nonlawyer providers to advise them on legal issues (accounting firms, consultants, etc.).
Public Choice Concepts next addresses the work of Mancur Olson
(pp. 55–56). Olson’s seminal work analyzed the nature of political mobiliza-

http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1008989) (“Appointed judges . . . labor to write
opinions that will be admired.”).
26. Pp. 49–51; George J. Stigler, The theory of economic regulation, 2 Bell J. Econ. &
Mgmt. Sci. 3 (1971).
27.
(1976).

Sam Peltzman, Toward a More General Theory of Regulation, 19 J.L. & Econ. 211

28. Gary Becker, Comment, 19 J.L. & Econ. 245 (1976) (responding to Peltzman, supra
note 27).
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29

tion of interest groups. Among his contributions was to note that if all
members of a group benefit from a given policy, some group members will
be able to free ride off of other group members who work to enact the policy. Therefore, each member of the group has an incentive to shirk his
responsibility to enact the change of policy. To solve the free-rider problem,
successful groups exclude free riders from group benefits. In this vein, some
groups are more effective than others based upon the size of the group. A
smaller group with fewer members who each have a larger individual stake
will be more effective than a larger group whose members have smaller individual stakes in the policy.
To illustrate Olson’s insights in application, Public Choice Concepts
uses the example of the imposition of steel tariffs by the George W. Bush
Administration (pp. 53–57). The US steel industry lobbied for protection
from lower cost steel imports. This small and organized group extracted
rents from the Bush Administration and limited free-rider problems through
targeted subsidies.
In the next chapter, Stearns and Zywicki explain social choice theory
(Chapter Three). Social choice focuses on voting arrangements for collective decision making. Its premise is that majoritarian voting is not merely a
30
collection of individual interests to reach a collective result. Rather, each
actor has his own agenda in setting group decisions (pp. 94–95). Social
choice thereby suggests limitations to the idea of majority rule based on
individual interests. Public Choice Concepts explores two important theoretical contributions to social choice theory. The first is the Marquis de
31
Condorcet’s binary voting paradox. What makes voting a paradox is that
collective preferences in voting are cyclic (a majority of the voters prefer
candidate A to candidate B, a majority prefer B to C, and a majority prefer
C to A) and hence majority preferences might oppose each other.
The second building block is Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem, which is
32
an attempt to explain majoritarian voting. According to the theorem, individual preferences in voting may not translate into a collective preference.
No voting system can satisfy four basic conditions: universal domain, Pareto
33
optimality, independence of irrelevant alternatives, and nondictatorship.
Put differently, no voting system meant to overcome cycling can comply

29. Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory
of Groups (1965).
30. There are a number of different implications for social choice as it relates to legal institutions, which are not limited merely to voting. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., Interpreting
Legislative Inaction, 87 Mich. L. Rev. 67, 108–22 (1988); Richard H. Pildes, The Theory of Political Competition, 85 Va. L. Rev. 1605, 1611 (1999).
31. Pp. 101–05. Public Choice Concepts suggests Condorcet as one of the founders of social
choice. P. 94. Yet, the intellectual origins go as far back as Pliney the Younger and include a number
of other contributions prior to Condorcet. Wulf Gaertner, A Primer in Social Choice Theory
3–4 (2006).
32. Pp. 138–43. Kenneth J. Arrow, Social Choice and Individual Values 46–60 (2d
ed. 1963).
33.

William H. Riker, Liberalism Against Populism 115–20 (Waveland Press 1988).
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with all of the above conditions given possible preference orders. The theory
explains the fundamental tension that collective decision making faces in
creating rational outcomes that are also fair.
Social choice serves as a prism through which to construct various proposals for institutional reform. Institutional structure can change by
introducing various processes and mechanisms that constrain choices. Introducing greater political competition into electoral institutions could improve
outcomes by preventing political actors from becoming entrenched in their
34
positions through manipulating the voting system to benefit themselves.
Public Choice Concepts provides an application of social choice cycling
in the bankruptcy law context (pp. 165–67). Bankruptcy may change the
nature of the preexisting property rights, and various voting strategies impact the allocation of these rights. Imagine a world with three creditors. The
debtor owes each creditor $500,000. The incentive of each creditor is to receive a full payout. Doing so would end the debtor’s business as a going
concern. Social choice helps us to determine the system of majority decision
making to deal with the debtor’s business. The problem of three equally
situated creditors is easily apparent. Creditors A and B can form a coalition
to split the $500,000. However, complexity is introduced when Creditor C
approaches Creditor B and proposes a coalition that would lead to a larger
payoff for B ($300,000 for B and $200,000 for C). B would therefore abandon the coalition with A in favor of the coalition with C. Of course, A can
play this game too. Creditor A can approach Creditor C and propose a coalition between A and C where A receives $200,000 and C receives $300,000.
Not to be left out of the potential payoff, B might react and suggest to A that
A receive a $300,000 payoff and B receive a $200,000 payoff. We do not
have greater stability but we have a number of potential coalitions in bankruptcy of AB, BC, CA, and AB.
We can view the Bankruptcy Code as an attempt to solve the empty core
35
and cycling problems that would be inherent in bankruptcy. The code creates a system of priority of debt for creditors and a set of voting rules that
create unequal bargaining positions among the creditors. This includes pri36
37
ority of distribution and voting. Inequality in bargaining position is also
38
generated by “cramdown” rights. Secured claims get paid present value in
full over time. Priority claims get paid in full on the date of confirmation.
Unsecured claims get at least what they would get in a liquidation.

34. See Samuel Issacharoff & Richard H. Pildes, Politics As Markets: Partisan Lockups of
the Democratic Process, 50 Stan. L. Rev. 643, 648–50 (1998).
35. Yet, the bankruptcy system does not solve all opportunities for strategic gaming. See
Douglas G. Baird & Randal C. Picker, A Simple Noncooperative Bargaining Model of Corporate
Reorganizations, 20 J. Legal Stud. 311 (1991).
36.

See 11 U.S.C. §§ 507, 725 (2006).

37.

See id. § 1126.

38. See id. § 1129(b). There are some limitations. For example, equity holders often get
something in consensual plans that could not actually be crammed down because they violate absolute priority.
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Chapter Four of Public Choice Concepts provides an easy-to-follow
analysis of game theory. In addition to describing the basic games of game
theory, the strength of Public Choice Concepts is that it explains that the
prisoner’s dilemma is not the only (or correct) solution to a collective action
problem (pp. 173–75). Analyze a problem with the wrong game and the policy prescriptions that flow from the analysis will be flawed.
The chapter begins with an analysis of a single-period prisoner’s dilemma (pp. 171–76). This allows for an explanation of the basic premises
behind cooperation and defection strategies. The chapter then adds complexity by introducing a multiple-iteration prisoner’s dilemma (pp. 176–95). The
chapter then proceeds to explore games with multiple pure Nash strategy
equilibria, including the driving game, the battle of the sexes game, and the
game of chicken (pp. 196–224). It also introduces a game with no pure Nash
strategy equilibrium (pp. 224–26). Stearns and Zywicki then apply the various games to substantive areas of law (pp. 226–42).
The final chapters discuss areas of law that have been the staple of much
public choice legal literature—the legislative, executive, and judicial
branches; administrative agencies; and constitution making. Chapter Six,
regarding the executive branch and administrative agencies, is particularly
good. Agency-cost problems exist between the legislature and administrative
agencies. One common solution noted by the literature is to create law to
better monitor administrative agencies. Monitoring allows for other actors
(such as the courts) to protect the original legislative bargain and to lock in
39
the policy preferences of the original bargain. The highly proceduralized
administrative law system, with judicial review and transparency require40
ments, is a policy tool to address agency costs.
C. Critiques
Stearns and Zywicki provide a few critiques of public choice. However,
these critiques perhaps are too limited. Green and Shapiro’s Pathologies of
41
Rational Choice receives only a single page of discussion (pp. 91–92).
Public Choice Concepts focuses on Green and Shapiro’s assertion that public choice theories may utilize claims not borne out by the empirical

39. See Matthew D. McCubbins et al., Administrative Procedures as Instruments of Political
Control, 3 J.L. Econ. & Org. 243 (1987) (discussing oversight and administrative procedures as
political controls on bureaucratic decision making); Matthew D. McCubbins et al., Structure and
Process, Politics and Policy: Administrative Arrangements and the Political Control of Agencies, 75
Va. L. Rev. 431 (1989) (further analyzing administrative structure, procedure, and oversight);
McNollgast, The Political Origins of the Administrative Procedure Act, 15 J.L. Econ. & Org. 180
(1999) (expounding the significance of procedural requirements considered by the Administrative
Procedure Act of 1946).
40. Jerry Mashaw, Public Law and Public Choice: Critique and Rapprochement in Research Handbook in Public Law and Public Choice, supra note 6 (manuscript at 11), available
at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1326613.
41. Donald P. Green & Ian Shapiro, Pathologies of Rational Choice Theory: A
Critique of Applications in Political Science (1994).
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42

record. In their defense, throughout the book, Stearns and Zywicki return
to whether or not the claims of public choice exceed empirical results. Similarly, Public Choice Concepts gives Elhauge’s critique of public choice’s
43
lack of a normative baseline only two pages (pp. 89–91). The book could
have built the case for public choice more forcefully by providing greater
voice for the criticisms of public choice and comprehensively responding to
these criticisms.
One might have addressed early on in the book a critique of public
choice based on limits to the neoclassical rational actor model. The utility
function that a rational actor maximizes may be impacted by a number of
shortcomings in how people actually behave and the mental shortcuts that
people take. A number of books and articles argue that people are not as
44
predictable in certain scenarios as neoclassical economics assumes. Instead, a number of behavioral heuristics lead to outcomes that may be at
odds with rational choice.
The lack of focus on behavioral law-and-economics in the book is
somewhat surprising. As Richard Epstein explains, “There is little doubt that
the major new theoretical approach to law and economics in the past two
decades does not come from either of these two fields. Instead it comes
from the adjacent discipline of cognitive psychology, which has now
45
morphed into behavioral economics.” One limitation on rational actors is
bounded rationality, in which people take mental shortcuts in their decision
making. For example, the work of Kahneman and Tversky suggests that
46
people’s decision making will be biased by the availability heuristic. People will predict the frequency of an event occurring based on how often they
recall such events occurring. Events that receive disproportionate media
coverage will be recalled more easily and thus overestimated. Therefore,
people will overestimate the chance of being killed in a plane crash (because
they are more likely to read about it in the news) and underestimate the
47
chance of being killed by heart disease.
The critique of public choice based on these behavioral insights is that,
as a descriptive matter, public choice (as a subset of rational choice) might

42. Id. at 11 (“Too often prescriptive conclusions . . . are floated on empirically dubious
rational choice hypotheses . . . .”).
43. Einer R. Elhauge, Does Interest Group Theory Justify More Intrusive Judicial Review?,
101 Yale L.J. 31, 49–52 (1991).
44. See, e.g., Dan Ariely, Predictably Irrational: The Hidden Forces That Shape
Our Decisions (2008) (describing common psychological departures from rational choice theory);
Richard H. Thaler & Cass R. Sunstein, Nudge: Improving Decisions About Health,
Wealth, and Happiness (2008) (making policy recommendations that attempt to minimize the
impact of people’s departures from neoclassical rationality).
45. Richard A. Epstein, The Neoclassical Economics of Consumer Contracts, 92 Minn. L.
Rev. 803, 803 (2008).
46. Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment under uncertainty: Heuristics and biases,
in Judgment under uncertainty 3, 11 (Daniel Kahneman et al. eds., 1982).
47. Paul Horwitz, Free Speech as Risk Analysis: Heuristics, Biases, and Institutions in the
First Amendment, 76 Temp. L. Rev. 1, 20 (2003).
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not be particularly good in explaining human behavior. As a normative mat48
ter, laws informed by public choice might be similarly shortsighted. Based
on such public choice limitations, some scholars suggest that government
should draft paternalistic policies to yield improvements in individuals’ wel49
fare. However, behavioral critiques of public choice cannot have it both
ways. If it is possible for individuals to make misguided policy choices, then
it is also possible for government actors to have the same behavioral biases
50
in creating policy.
A policy of paternalism may increase rather than decrease the costs of
government decision making. A behavioral critique assumes that in making
policy decisions, government policymakers are immune from interest group
capture or their own self-interest. Paternalism assumes that people will be
limited in their ability to learn the truth. Therefore, paternalism raises the
payoff for successfully implementing a paternalistic government policy to
51
benefit a particular interest group. Paternalism is also subject to public
choice concerns on the part of government decision makers. Government
actors might take various heuristical shortcuts in their decision making but
still be prone to self-interested behavior.
One might question some of the assumptions behind public choice because rationality in politics might be different than rationality in the market.
52
Maybe people are less selfish in politics than they are elsewhere. If we assume people are sometimes irrational, we need to ask, where are they more
likely to be rational? It is more likely that people will behave rationally ig53
norant in politics than in the market. In politics, there is significant voter
ignorance. Because you know that the chance your vote will affect the outcome of an election or of any given policy debate will be small, you will be

48. We also might want people (and government) to make mistakes because it allows actors
to learn from them. Jonathan Klick & Gregory Mitchell, Government Regulation of Irrationality:
Moral and Cognitive Hazards, 90 Minn. L. Rev. 1620 (2006) (making the case for self-debiasing).
49. E.g., Colin Camerer et al., Regulation for Conservatives: Behavioral Economics and the
Case for “Asymmetric Paternalism,” 151 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1211 (2003) (“To the extent that errors
identified by behavioral research lead people not to behave in their own best interest, paternalism
may prove useful.”); Cass R. Sunstein & Richard H. Thaler, Libertarian Paternalism Is Not an
Oxymoron, 70 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1159 (2003) (“We urge that [libertarian paternalistic] rules should be
chosen with the explicit goal of improving the welfare of the people affected by them.”).
50. Russell Korobkin, Libertarian Welfarism, 97 Calif. L. Rev. 1651, 1652 (2009) (“If I
can’t figure out whether I would be better off owning a car equipped with expensive airbags or a
slightly more dangerous (and cheaper) automobile and the concomitant ability to purchase some
other goods and services, why should I be confident that a state functionary can do any better?”).
51. See Edward L. Glaeser, Paternalism and Psychology, 73 U. Chi. L. Rev. 133, 134, 145–
46 (2006).
52. See generally Beyond Self-Interest (Jane J. Mansbridge ed., 1990) (collection of
essays arguing against the idea that human behavior is rooted in a narrowly conceived definition of
self-interest).
53. See Glaeser, supra note 51, at 144–45 (“Consumers face stronger incentives to correct
errors that directly impact their well-being than do government bureaucrats.”).
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54

less likely to inform yourself about the issues. With your money and your
purchases, however, you have more incentive to get information because
you will benefit from making a better decision. In sum, markets reward ra55
tional behavior and punish bad behavior.
Another critique of Public Choice Concepts is that Stearns and Zywicki
use a broad understanding of “self-interest” for rational actors. They do so
to counter the perception that public choice is only about the private inter56
ests of actors. Politicians value more than just reelection. An overly broad
57
generalization about rationality has its limits. If self-interest can mean just
about anything, then it is not constraining the analysis. Under such a theory
Mother Teresa is just as self-interested as Bernie Madoff; the only difference
is that she was self-interested to do social good and he was self-interested to
do good for himself and not his investors.
Public choice relies not just on the assumption of selfishness, but on selection effects. For example, maybe a congressman or bureaucrat does not
care about survival in office and just wants to advance the public good. But
such people will not stay in power for long unless they act selfishly. Selfish
leaders or those who merely act selfishly will push out the altruistic ones
over time, just as profit-maximizing firms in the market will tend to out58
compete those that are indifferent to profit.
Stearns and Zywicki do better when it comes to expressing critiques of
the limitations and disagreements that exist across a number of different
public choice models. Public choice theoretical models have become more
complex. Early models became refined with better theories and better em59
pirical analysis to guide them. Public Choice Concepts does a good job of
exploring the limitations of early models and exploring the refinements and
alternative public choice that have arisen in the study of public choice. It
also presents the empirical work in the area and makes a good effort at not
drawing overly broad inferences from the empirical literature.
II. The Growing Importance of Public Choice
in International Law
The primary limitation of the otherwise excellent Public Choice Concepts is its coverage, or lack thereof, of international issues. Global issues
54. Ilya Somin, Political Ignorance and the Countermajoritarian Difficulty: A New Perspective on the Central Obsession of Constitutional Theory, 89 Iowa L. Rev. 1287, 1290–96 (2004)
(providing a summary of the voter ignorance literature).
55.

Ilya Somin, Democracy and Political Ignorance (forthcoming).

56. Edward L. Rubin, Public Choice, Phenomenology, and the Meaning of the Modern State:
Keep the Bathwater, but Throw Out That Baby, 87 Cornell L. Rev. 309, 322 (2002).
57. Jeffrey L. Harrison, Piercing Pareto Superiority: Real People and the Obligations of
Legal Theory, 39 Ariz. L. Rev. 1, 2 (1997).
58. D. Daniel Sokol, Competition Policy and Comparative Corporate Governance of StateOwned Enterprises, 2009 BYU L. Rev. 1713, 1727–31.
59. For example, Farber and Frickey introduced greater nuance and complexity to the relationship between interest groups and legislators. Farber & Frickey, supra note 9, at 17–21.
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involving complex regulation—from climate change to financial regulation—play an increasingly large role in US policymaking. If public choice
can explain the behavior of actors on national issues, it also provides important insights into international organizations. Indeed, there is an increasing
60
literature devoted to various public choice international issues.
Public Choice Concepts would have added value by explaining how the
assumptions of public choice at the domestic level may be challenged in
their applications with multiple levels of actors at subnational, national, and
international levels. The interplay of public choice at these levels creates
particularly complex dynamics that require examination. Institutional design
for addressing global problems in areas of complex regulation is at the forefront in many substantive areas of law and policy. Some types of
institutional design seem to be more effective than others in reaching better
outcomes. This Part uses public choice to explain the current dynamics of
international antitrust law. The Part discusses how public-choice-related
institutional design flaws impeded a World Trade Organization (“WTO”)
“hard law” solution, and instead led to the creation of “soft law” institutional alternative: the International Competition Network (“ICN”).
A. International Antitrust and Hard Law
As a result of the complexity of globalization and overlapping regulation, one fundamental issue in the international sphere is the amount and
nature of coordination needed across jurisdictions. The form of coordination, both as a positive and normative matter, may determine the
effectiveness of such coordination. In some cases, weak coordination may
not lead to optimal results. Instead, there may need to be a deeper integra61
tion of systems based upon a global standard.
Hard law is a formalized governance model that relies upon formal rules
to bind countries and their subunits. Increased hard law governance, meant
to lock in present domestic decision makers’ policy preferences for future
decision makers, represents one type of mechanism that facilitates more
deeply integrated standards. Hard law governance has more formality and is
more binding than soft law agreements, which are based more on informal
norms. Harder agreements are produced with greater transaction costs precisely because they are “hard.” More people spend more time negotiating
62
such agreements. Moreover, such agreements are harder to change.

60. See, e.g., John O. McGinnis & Mark L. Movsesian, Against Global Governance in the
WTO, 45 Harv. Int’l L.J. 353 (2004); Paul B. Stephan III, Barbarians Inside the Gate: Public
Choice Theory and International Economic Law, 10 Am. U. J. Int’l L. & Pol’y 745 (1995); Alan
O. Sykes, Protectionism as a “Safeguard”: A Positive Analysis of the GATT “Escape Clause” with
Normative Speculations, 58 U. Chi. L. Rev. 255 (1991).
61. See Maxwell L. Stearns, The New Commerce Clause Doctrine in Game Theoretical
Perspective, 60 Vand. L. Rev. 1, 9 (2007) (addressing similar tradeoffs in the Commerce Clause
context).
62. Andrew T. Guzman, Public Choice and International Regulatory Competition, 90 Geo.
L.J. 971, 980–81 (2002).

SOKOL FTP CORRECTED VERSION_C.DOC

1042

5/6/2011 1:37:02 PM

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 109:1029

Hard law agreements, such as WTO agreements, can take the form of a
stand-alone governance structure that reaches a number of different areas of
63
regulation. Some stand-alone organizations built along a single issue may
not achieve their intended goals because single-issue organizations may be
more easily captured by interest groups. In public international law, such as
human rights law, organizational design flaws may leave the very actors that
should be constrained in their behavior unconstrained. Indeed, these actors
can to some degree control the content of the law and make things worse
64
than they were before.
An example of the growing movement towards greater cooperation and
coordination in an area of complex regulation is antitrust. There are more
65
than one hundred jurisdictions with antitrust enforcement. Antitrust must
address a growing set of international problems due to increasing globalization. Globalization has both positive and negative effects on a given
country’s market. On the one hand, globalization allows for either potential
or actual entry in tradable sectors. This puts a downward pressure on price.
66
Consumers benefit from this greater competition. On the other hand, increased globalization allows for the spread of anticompetitive behavior
67
across borders.
Having so many antitrust jurisdictions creates coordination problems for
antitrust agencies. From a business perspective, different rules across jurisdictions increase compliance costs in two ways. Different rules require
businesses to develop policies to ensure compliance with the various standards, such as coordination of merger filings. Disparate standards also
increase compliance costs because of the need for global companies to
comply with different substantive standards, some of which, such as multiproduct bundling, are more restrictive than others.
How much convergence is optimal in both procedural and substantive
antitrust is an open question. Increased uniformity across jurisdictions may
allow global capture. However, coordination costs or spillover costs of anticompetitive conduct may be a large enough problem that deeper global
integration may overcome these concerns.
International anticompetitive behavior takes two forms. The first is a
spillover of anticompetitive effects from one jurisdiction to another. For example, firms may collude in price fixing cartels across countries. Cartels
63.

Andrew T. Guzman, Global Governance and the WTO, 45 Harv. Int’l L.J. 303 (2004).

64. See John McGinnis & Ilya Somin, Democracy and International Human Rights Law, 84
Notre Dame L. Rev. 1739, 1765–68, 1775–79 (2009); John O. McGinnis & Ilya Somin, Should
International Law Be Part of Our Law?, 59 Stan. L. Rev. 1175, 1233–46 (2007) (discussing the
limitations of international law compared to US law regarding foreign citizens).
65. International
Competition
Network,
Member
Directory,
http://www.
internationalcompetitionnetwork.org (follow “Members” hyperlink) (last visited Aug. 20, 2010).
66. D. Daniel Sokol, Order Without (Enforceable) Law: Why Countries Enter Into NonEnforceable Competition Policy Chapters in Free Trade Agreements, 83 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 231,
238 (2008).
67. See Eleanor M. Fox, International Antitrust and the Doha Dome, 43 Va. J. Int’l L. 911,
917 (2003).
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hurt consumers by charging higher prices than the market would allow
without collusion. The difficulty of detecting collusion may make it hard for
any given jurisdiction to uncover the cartel. Documents may be hidden and
meetings of cartel members may occur in third-party jurisdictions, both of
which raise the cost of detection for any particular antitrust agency. Additionally, the effects of the cartel might not be apparent to a given antitrust
agency. Moreover, a cartel can punish a noncompliant member in a third
jurisdiction to enforce the cartel.
Spillover effects might also include the impact of substantive antitrust
rules in an important jurisdiction (the United States or the European Union)
upon the global operations of a firm. When one of the major powers in antitrust has an overly restrictive antitrust policy, this standard becomes the
global standard. With stricter antitrust in one of the major antitrust jurisdictions, competitors might arbitrage the differences in enforcement posture
and lobby the stricter enforcer to bring cases against its competitor in order
68
to affect the competitor’s global business.
A second issue emerges from globalization. When countries create various barriers to entry to foreign products and services, sometimes this may
be to protect domestic constituencies that have lobbied for protection. Protection takes the form of legislation that creates immunity from antitrust.
The immunity prevents antitrust from correcting for market failures such as
69
monopolization.
Harmonization of procedures or substantive standards across jurisdictions can remove unnecessary costs of doing business caused by
overlapping or contradictory approaches. For example, jurisdictions might
have different reporting requirements for premerger notification. This
might include how much and what sort of information to include with a
merger filing, the timing of the merger review, the transparency of the
merger review process, and the confidentiality of information, among
other issues. Procedural issues in international law tend not to have the
same political salience as substantive issues because there is not a strong
enough interest group that will push for optimal procedural changes glob70
ally. Yet, international cooperation in antitrust in most settings will be
welfare-improving on purely procedural matters. Coordination will yield a
better flow of information, less redundancy in the use of antitrust agency
resources, and less delay and uncertainty for businesses.
Public choice can help to explain the various institutional arrangements
that international antitrust has taken. It also helps to explain why certain
antitrust issues have been addressed internationally through soft law rather

68. See Damien Geradin, The Perils of Antitrust Proliferation: The Globalization of Antitrust
and the Risks of Overregulation of Competitive Behavior, 10 Chi. J. Int’l L. 189, 192 (2009).
69. D. Daniel Sokol, Limiting AntiCompetitive Government Interventions That Benefit Special Interests, 17 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 119 (2009) (discussing negative impacts of antitrust
immunity).
70. Erin Ann O’Hara, Economics, Public Choice, and the Perennial Conflict of Laws, 90
Geo. L.J. 941, 950 (2002).

SOKOL FTP CORRECTED VERSION_C.DOC

1044

5/6/2011 1:37:02 PM

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 109:1029

than at the domestic level or via hard law. There is an emerging literature
that examines rational choice theory and public choice implications in soft
71
law. To date, this has not been extended extensively to the area of interna72
tional antitrust. A public choice analysis of international antitrust has been
73
lacking, although analysis of US antitrust is well-developed.
In 1996, the WTO Singapore Ministerial officially put the intersection of
trade and antitrust on the negotiating table in WTO negotiations. Initial
ideas of the potential for WTO antitrust regulation were far-ranging. They
included proposals for a worldwide merger authority. They also included
increased WTO powers to address international cartels, international monopolization, and other activities that previously had been within the
purview of domestic antitrust authorities. Antitrust authorities recognized
that should the WTO have such power, it would come at the expense of do74
mestic antitrust agencies.
A number of antitrust agencies were concerned that trade negotiators did
not understand antitrust economics and that trade negotiation was much
more of a tradeoff among interest groups. Therefore, trade negotiators
would be far more willing to create a series of antitrust standards that might
be overly tolerant of anticompetitive behavior, because optimal antitrust
enforcement could be traded-off for a reduction in agriculture tariffs or
lower phytosanitary standards. Such logrolling in an international agreement
could reduce global welfare.
Antitrust agencies enjoyed having a monopoly over setting antitrust
standards for their respective jurisdictions. A global standard would be an
75
imposition from above. It would reduce antitrust prosecutorial discretion.
Even what seemed like relatively harmless issues in the WTO talks, such as
transparency, nondiscrimination, procedural fairness, voluntary cooperation,
and capacity building, became somewhat contentious. The reason for this
concern was that coordination, if through the WTO, would occur through an
organization that was based on negotiations at the country-to-country level.
Antitrust agency officials would not have had final say on the nature or form
of coordination. Particularly, the US antitrust agencies were worried about
the implications of giving up too much sovereignty in a process that they
71. See, e.g., Tim Büthe & Walter Mattli, International Standards and Standard-Setting
Bodies, in The Oxford Handbook of Business and Government 440, 440–71 (David Coen et
al. eds., 2010) (reviewing the literature on standard-setting international organizations); David Andrew Singer, Regulating Capital: Setting Standards for the International Financial
System (2007) (describing public choice concerns in IOSCO and Basel Accords).
72. But see Andrew Guzman, Cooperation, Comity and Competition Policy (forthcoming 2010).
73. See, e.g., Fred S. McChesney & William F. Shughart II, The Causes and Consequences of Antitrust: The Public-Choice Perspective (1995).
74. See D. Daniel Sokol, Monopolists Without Borders: The Institutional Challenge of International Antitrust in a Global Gilded Age, 4 Berkeley Bus. L.J. 37, 50–51 (2007); Joel I. Klein,
Acting Assistant Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Address to The Royal Institute of International
Affairs: A Note of Caution with Respect to a WTO Agenda on Competition Policy (Nov. 18, 1996),
available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/speeches/0998.pdf.
75.

Klein, supra note 74.
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could not control once the new institution was created. Antitrust enforcers
were concerned that this sort of cooperation would somehow “politicize”
antitrust, which antitrust practitioners believe is not political (even though
76
public choice teaches that antitrust agencies can and do behave politically).
Some developing-world antitrust agencies were concerned that a global
standard allowing for competition would enable developed-world multina77
tionals to exploit the developing world. In the context of public choice,
these developing-world negotiators worried that by creating competition
among the most efficient producers, foreign firms might drive out inefficient
domestic firms, which would lead to a potentially severe political backlash.
The emerging institutional structure affected the positions of the United
States and increasingly the European Union. Once a binding global competition system would be established, the institutional structure would limit the
choices of the United States and the European Union. WTO dispute resolution might be used against the US or EU on dubious competition grounds
78
but still result in trade liability. Because WTO judges are inexpert on competition matters, an adverse ruling might create suboptimal antitrust
79
enforcement.
B. International Antitrust and Soft Law
Soft law lacks the formal binding force of hard law. This results in
lower-stakes bargaining among soft law participants. Soft law is an institutional choice that a domestic level agency may implement, whereas hard law
involves adjudication. In spite of being “soft,” soft law may encourage more
cooperation among parties that have divergent interests and various levels of
power. Additionally, its flexibility allows for soft law to change more rapidly
than hard law, given changing circumstances.
A soft law approach suggests a coordination game based on voluntary
80
global standards. It may be optimal to allow this sort of country-level
tinkering in doctrine and economic approaches in antitrust. From this tinkering, better practices can emerge. This approach requires an institution that
allows for bottom-up norm creation.
Public choice provides an analytical framework to explain the use of soft
law in antitrust and its implementation. When the US and the EU are behind
76. See Barry R. Weingast & Mark J. Moran, Bureaucratic Discretion or Congressional
Control? Regulatory Policymaking by the Federal Trade Commission, 91 J. Pol. Econ. 765 (1983)
(finding substantial evidence of congressional influence over Federal Trade Commission decisions);
Timothy J. Muris, Regulatory Policymaking at the Federal Trade Commission: The Extent of Congressional Control, 94 J. Pol. Econ. 884 (1986) (criticizing Weingast and Moran’s method but
finding influence on other grounds).
77.
(2010).

David J. Gerber, Global Competition: Law, Markets and Globalization 106–07

78.

See Sokol, supra note 69, at 164–74.

79.

Id. at 164–65.

80. Duncan Snidal, Coordination versus Prisoners’ Dilemma: Implications for International
Cooperation and Regimes, 79 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 923, 941 (1985).
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soft law norms, this has a powerful bandwaggoning effect. Other countries
want to be seen as part of the club. They also rely on the EU and US for
technical assistance and capacity building, and the US and EU experts will
81
push this agenda. Aid may be contingent on implementing these norms.
Public choice explains why the ICN was formed and made the primary
institution for global antitrust coordination and substantive convergence.
Other global institutions had greater public choice concerns. Until roughly
the time of the creation of the ICN, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (“OECD”) focused on discussions of specific
issues and had not created significant convergence on procedural or substantive issues. The OECD was at the time less flexible and had its own
bureaucracy as an interest group in addition to the smaller set of countries
deciding policy. It also required greater sign-off by political units other than
82
the antitrust agencies involved in international affairs.
The US responded to the weaknesses of the OECD and WTO by formulating an alternative institutional structure. The new structure would allow
83
for greater control by the domestic antitrust agencies. From the public
choice perspective, it also embedded the policy preferences of the largest
and most powerful agencies since they were the ones that had the most resources that could be used in the ICN. The ICN was established in 2001. Its
members include all of the world’s antitrust agencies regardless of size or
84
level of economic development. The ICN has its origins in two key developments. First, it is the intellectual brainchild of the important International
Competition Policy Advisory Committee (“ICPAC”) report of 2000, which
85
contemplated a bottom-up, agency-to-agency soft law approach. The second development was significant disagreement between the US and the
European Commission on the GE/Honeywell proposed merger. As a result
of this disagreement, healing the rift across the Atlantic took on new impor86
tance.
Initially, the ICN focused on mergers. It quickly expanded into cartels,
regulated areas, capacity building, and unilateral conduct. Perhaps there was
some mission creep or perhaps the ICN was seen as less political and therefore a better forum for increased cooperation. The ICN has had an important
impact in creating change (both perceived and more directly measurable) in
the implementation of benchmarked better practices across a number of dif-

81. D. Daniel Sokol, The Future of International Antitrust and Improving Antitrust Agency
Capacity, 103 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1081, 1086–87 (2009).
82.

Sokol, supra note 74, at 99.

83.

Id. at 51–52.

84.

See id. at 105–15 (providing details of the ICN).

85. Int’l Competition Policy Advisory Comm. Antitrust Div., Final Report to the
Attorney General and Assistant Attorney General for Antitrust, 286–87 (2000), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/icpac/finalreport.htm (proposing an international mediation forum
for competition disputes).
86. Abbott B. Lipsky, Jr., Managing Antitrust Compliance Through the Continuing Surge in
Global Enforcement, 75 Antitrust L.J. 965, 972–73 (2009).
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ferent areas, both procedural and substantive. There are two reasons that
explain the success of the ICN: (1) institutional design and (2) a modest
agenda that began with issues in which it would be possible to measure success relatively easily and quickly.
In terms of its institutional structure, the ICN is unlike other international antitrust institutions. First, the ICN is transnational (interactions
across national boundaries with state and nonstate actors) rather than transgovernmental (interactions across national boundaries with state actors
only). It has active involvement from academics, private-sector attorneys
with in-house and law firm backgrounds, economists from consulting firms,
and civil society groups. This participation spans both developing- and developed-world nongovernmental actors. The ICN is a virtual institution
without any headquarters or permanent staff. Normally, a bureaucracy might
create opportunities for free riding by antitrust agency leadership and staff.
With no such staff, there are more limited opportunities for free riding at the
ICN. The virtual nature also prevents bureaucratic creep by ICN officials
who might try to expand the mission of the network. Indeed, the current
theme within the ICN is to do fewer things but to better implement them.
The private sector (mostly defense-side European and North American
law firms) supported the ICN because the ICN allowed it to lobby in a central location for conforming procedural rules and cooperation that would
benefit it. Increased coordination on procedural issues would reduce business costs. International business could also use better access to lobby on
more substantive issues that might emerge. It has incentives to volunteer in
the various working groups because it can advantage its positions by setting
up best practices that allow for more of a pro-defense position. There might
be some overlap between public and private good because the standard that
business pushes internationally might also be the optimal standard for procedural and substantive antitrust. The institutional design of the ICN allows
for better alignment of public and private good. Where there is pushback by
countries in certain areas, it is often a combination of government and business interests.
Antitrust lawyers have incentive to make a transnational organization
like the ICN succeed. Because of the highly technical nature of antitrust,
such an organization allows them to leverage their expertise to maximize
their own wealth and their clients’ interests. The more technical antitrust
coordination and cooperation becomes, the more important antitrust lawyers
87
become to making the system a success.
A number of academics are involved in the ICN. One might believe that
academics are involved merely for altruistic reasons. However, they might
have additional public-choice-related reasons for their involvement in the
organization. They might want to further their own academic careers. They
also might be willing to become involved to better establish themselves for
future consulting opportunities as experts for law firms, antitrust agencies,
87. Cf. Todd J. Zywicki, The Past, Present, and Future of Bankruptcy Law in America, 101
Mich. L. Rev. 2016, 2023 (2003) (providing a similar public choice analysis in bankruptcy).
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or international antitrust organizations. The ICN also provides an opportunity to meet future collaborators from around the world.
International antitrust exemplifies the two tugs of Public Choice Concepts. Public choice provides a positive description of international antitrust
developments. It also provides the background for normative analysis to
make international antitrust institutions more effective.
Conclusion
Public Choice Concepts makes an important contribution to the understanding of public choice in law. The book has insights that make it an
important basis for both a stand-alone class and to enrich the understanding
of existing classes. An interesting experiment will be to track whether
greater awareness of public choice issues will lead to better outcomes in
terms of the design of policy by the next generation of decision makers, or if
public choice will remain merely a descriptive analytical tool.

